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Este ensayo analiza los experimentos con el sistema representativo en la Nueva España primero y en
México después. Las elecciones que se realizaron todavía bajo el dominio español dieron cuenta de las
dinámicas políticas de esta forma de gobierno, como la amplia participación política. Se estudian las
elecciones durante las primeras  décadas de la independencia, hasta el comienzo de la guerra con Estados
Unidos, y  se encuentra que a pesar de que para los años treinta del siglo XIX había una consenso creciente
entre las elites sobre la deseabilidad de excluir a las clases populares de las elecciones fue imposible
mantener las exclusiones censitarias durante mucho tiempo. Ninguna de las facciones fue capaz de
abstenerse de acudir a las "clases peligrosas". El capítulo da cuenta de las razones de esta imposibilidad.
Existen diversas hipótesis para explicar este patrón. Se aduce que en un principio la incipiente apertura
de la franquicia obedeció a la competencia entre facciones antagónicas. Sin embargo, a finales de los años
1820 la movilización popular ocasionó desórdenes sociales, como la destrucción del mercado del Parián,
lo que ocasionó que empezara a ser vista como disfuncional por las élites. A mediados de los años 1830 las
clases dirigentes decidieron abstenerse de echar mano de las clases populares en las luchas electorales.
Sin embargo este acuerdo no duró, se propone, debido a que los conservadores abandonaron la idea del
sufragio censitario y los liberales, debido a sus triunfos electorales, renovaron su insistencia en mantener
una amplia franquicia.
PALABRAS-LLAVE: representative government; XIXth  century Mexico; voting rights; electoral practices;
political mobilization.
In 1815 an elderly John Adams wrote to James
Lloyd: “The people of South America are the most
ignorant, the most bigoted, the most superstitious
of all the Roman Catholics in Christendom […].
No Catholics on earth were so abjectly devoted
to their priests, as blindly superstitious as
I. INTRODUCTION
“Deseamos que el gobierno tenga la fuerza necesaria para cumplir con sus
deberes […]. Estamos decididos contra la federación; contra el sistema
representativo por el orden de elecciones que se ha seguido hasta ahora;
contra los ayuntamientos electivos y contra todo lo que se llama elección
popular, mientras no descanse sobre otras bases” (Alamán, 1986).
themselves, and these priests had the powers and
apparatus of the Inquisition to seize every
suspected person and suppress every rising
motion. Was it probable, was it possible, that such
a plan as [Francisco] Miranda’s, of a free
government, and a confederation of free
governments, should be introduced and
established among’ such a people, over that vast
continent, or any part of it? It appeared to me
more extravagant than the schemes of Condorcet
and Brissot to establish a democracy in France,
schemes which had always appeared to me as
absurd as similar plans would be to establish
1  I wish to thank Roberto Mostajo for his assistance in
researching and writing this paper. I would also like to
thank Alfredo Ávila, Eduardo Posada, Samuel Valenzuela
and Jorge E. Rodríguez for their detailed comments and
suggestions.
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democracies among the birds, beasts, and fishes
(ADAMS, 1856, p. 143-145)2.
Yet, by the time Adams wrote these often
quoted lines, Spanish America had already begun
to experiment with the institutions of
representative government and highly competitive
elections had taken place in New Spain in 1812.
It is indeed an irony that we know as much, if
not more, about elections conducted in New Spain
under colonial rule from 1809 to 1821 than about
some periods during the national era3. Elections
were very frequent events in Mexico. A yet to be
determined number (probably ranging in the
hundreds) of electoral contests took place at the
national, state and municipal levels during the 19th
century. Elections were perceived by political elites
as key to achieving political results, thus tinkering
and experimenting with electoral legislation was
very common. No less than forty-six different
statues and laws regulating elections were
enacted during the 19th Century4. If political
contest were, as early scholars thought, decided
mainly by military caudillos, Santa Anna-style,
then why was such an enormous amount of
energy placed on reforming electoral laws for a
very long time5?
It is easy to miss the significance of regular
institutions during an age of political turmoil and
instability. Yet, as Michael Costeloe remarked a
decade ago, “during the so-called age of Santa
Anna or three decades from Iturbide to Juárez
there were only four brief occasions on which
the executive branch enjoyed unrestricted
dominance. Indeed, one feature of the period,
which has been neither analyzed nor appreciated,
is the role of the legislative power, particularly
the National Congress that from 1822 onwards
was summoned and met, with one or two gaps,
more or less continuously. In 34 years, between
1821 and 1855, 22 congresses convened
(SORDO, 1994, p. 142-143)6. Thus, elections
took place quite often although they did not always
follow a regular calendar. The forty-six electoral
laws are, perhaps, explained by the fact that many
times losers decided to reform the mechanisms
for conducting elections instead of making war.
The military certainly dominated the route to
executive authority at both national and state levels
through revolt, but the generals, including and
perhaps above all Santa Anna, were singularly
unable to control the National Congress which
was always largely composed of popularly elected
civilians” (COSTELOE, 1986, p. 258).
 The absence of a well-documented history
of elections in Mexico is to be noted, particularly
at a time when finally the country has become a
functioning democracy. Perhaps, the lack of
interest in the electoral processes of the 19th
century is due to the belief that caudillismo and
political chaos rendered elections meaningless.
Also, for a long time elections – past and present
– were seen by some scholars as mere
manifestations of “formal democracy”. For
example, in 1985 Gustavo Emmerich described
the “electoral regimes” of the 19th Century as an
affair of the “dominant classes” (EMMERICH,
1985, p. 62).  However, very little research has
been conducted to support this claim. Empirical
studies at both the national and local level are
missing for key elections during the period. A few
recent accounts of electoral history go beyond
these limitations (see, for example, VARELA
ORTEGA & MEDINA PEÑA (2000)).
2  Letter to James Lloyd, March 27, 1815, The key reason
for Adams’ skepticism regarding the possibilities of
democracy in South America were the deleterious
consequences of religious intolerance.
3  The Cádiz Constitution was in force in New Spain very
few years: 1812-1814, and 1820-1821.
4  For a compendium of electoral laws in Mexico during
the 19th Century, see Orozco (1978).
5  During the colonial period (1812-1821), there were six
statues, Independence and First Empire, (1821-1823) there
were two, during the First Federal Republic (1824-1835)
there were four, during the Central Republic (1835-1846)
there were 11 laws, during the Second Federal Republic
(1847-1854) there were 10 statues, during the Ayutla
period  (1854-1857) there were two laws, during the
formation of  the Liberal Republic and until the fall of the
Second Empire (1857-1867) there were four laws, during
the Resto red Republic (1867-1876) there were eight laws
and during the rule of general Porfirio Díaz in the 19th
century  (1876-1900) there was only one law enacted, the
law of December 16 1882, “Decreto que reforma la ley
electoral de 12 de febrero de 1857”. This pattern needs to
be explained.
6  Note that if congress was renewed every two years (as
provided by the 1824 Constitution) and a normal calendar
had been observed for the period, there would have been
17 congresses elected between 1821 and 1855. Yet, there
were five more than expected.
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While the period 1867-1910 has received some
attention from past and present scholars, our
knowledge of elections between 1824 and 1857
is patchy at best. The period 1808-1824, which
covers the Cádiz experiment in New Spain and
the founding of Mexico has received continued
attention. The 1946 seminal work of Nettie Lee
Benson on the 1812 Mexico City election provided
a framework for the study of elections in Mexico
(Benson, 1946; 1955; 2004). More recently,
Virginia Guedea has studied the same period as
well as the electoral processes of the insurgents
(GUEDEA, 1991a; 1991b; 2001). The latest
account of the creation of representative
government in the early period is Alfredo Avilá’s
En nombre de la nación (AVILA, 1999). Benson’s
insight that the diputaciones provinciales created
by the Cádiz charter were key to the developing
of federalism in Mexico was followed many
decades later by the finding that political
fragmentation and instability was also due to the
establishment of ayuntamientos constitucionales
(constitutional townships) provided by the  same
constitution. Antonio Annino has extensively
developed this line of inquiry (ANNINO, 1995;
1996; ORTÍZ & SERRANO, 2007). Lately,
Spanish liberalism has also been revisited as well
as the relevance of the political crisis of the
Spanish Monarchy (CHUST, 1999; RODRÍ-
GUEZ, 2005a; 2008; BREÑA, 2006). The local
dynamics of elections have also been researched
in some regions, particularly Oaxaca
(BELLINGERI, 1995; ESCOBAR, 1996;
GUARDINO, 1998; 2003; 2007; CASTILLO,
2003; RODRÍGUEZ, 2005b; SERRANO, 2007).
Some studies have explored the relation
between elections and popular mobilization (DI
TELLA, 1994; WARREN, 1996; 2001; AVILA,
2004). The dynamics of political disintegration
and the role played by electoral processes have
also been explored as part of a broader account
of the period (COSTELOE, 1989, p. 257-275;
1996; 2000). The period known as the “Restored
Republic” (1867- 1876), when the Liberals finally
defeated their Conservative opponents and
imposed the 1857 liberal constitution, is better
known. Early scholarship, epitomized by historian
Daniel Cosío Villegas stressed the democratic
character of the period. Cosío believed that the
Restored Republic was an era of unparalleled
freedoms (VILLEGAS, 1953; 1957, p. 123-150).
However, more recent scholarship is quite critical
of the period. According to Laurens Ballard Perry,
elections were subject to constant manipulation
by local and national political leaders. Whenever
the President obtained congressional authorization
to resolve political conflicts in the states, the use
of federal intervention and emergency powers
was seldom neutral. Juárez, for instance, ignored
requests for federal intervention made by factional
enemies, even when Congress ordered the national
government to provide aid. At the same time, he
supported his local allies by decreeing states of
siege to allow electoral manipulation. These
resources allowed the executive to obtain the
selection of sympathetic electors, conduct electoral
fraud, establish political alliances and exercise other
forms of influence (PERRY, 1978). There are also
some new studies of elections, factional struggles
and the press during the Restored Republic (PALTI,
2003). The role played by electoral laws,
particularly by the initial no re-election law, in the
states during the Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) era has
been explored by scholars (CARMAGNANI, 1986;
1989; 1993; FALCÓN, 1988). As noted, the early
republic has received less attention. Thus this paper
centers on that period.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT IN NEW SPAIN 1812-
1821
The case for the impact of the years 1808-
1810 in Spain and America has been made by
Francois-Xavier Guerra (1980; 1992). In
considering the transition from colonial rule to
independence in New Spain there were three
lasting lessons of the early establishment of
representative institutions. First, elections had the
potential of mobilizing popular participation from
all quarters of society, secondly the authorities
organizing the elections could lose them and
thirdly the modes of organizing elections,
particularly the indirect system and voter
registration would prove to be enduring.
The first elections in New Spain preceded the
1812 Constitution. As a result of the invasion of
Spain by French troops, a Junta Central was
created in 1809 to represent all the Spanish
Monarchy, including the American colonies.
Elections of representatives to the Junta Central
were held throughout the Spanish world during
the year. Each province of Spain had two deputies
to the Junta Central whereas the nine American
kingdoms were allocated one each.
42
BEYOND THE RESTRICTIVE CONSENSUS: ELECTIONS IN MEXICO (1809-1847)
The Junta Central decreed on January 1, 1810
that elections be held for Cortes. In Europe, each
provincial junta and each city entitled to
representation in previous Cortes would select a
deputy. Also, a deputy was to be elected for every
50 000 souls (RODRÍGUEZ, 2008, p. 105)7. The
Junta dissolved and appointed a Council of
Regency, which approved a different electoral
process for America. Unlike the Spanish deputies,
American deputies carried instructions from their
provinces. Elections took place in New Spain
starting in June 1810. One point must be
mentioned. While the use of lots in the 1809
Spanish elections has not received much attention,
it is significant from the standpoint of the history
of representative government. Indeed, in the
republican tradition lots were frequently used but
disappeared at the end of the 18th century in the
Italian city-states. Remarkably, the 1810 Spanish
American elections were the last instance of lots
used in the western world. Guerra asserts that
selection by lot was not a republican, but rather a
traditional practice. A way to quell factionalism
and also a means to provide for divine intervention
(GUERRA, 1992, p. 192). Yet, this issue deserves
further investigation.
The Cortes promulgated the Constitution of
the Spanish Monarchy on March 19, 1812 and it
was sworn in Mexico City on September 30 of
the same year. The constitution enfranchised all
men, except those of African ancestry, vagrants,
criminals, debtors, and domestic servants8. Yet,
the Cádiz constitution firmly established what
Manin calls the “principle of distinction”.
Representatives were to be different, and superior,
to electors. The constitution provided that deputies
should have a rent from personal property (Art.
92). Even if Art. 93 suspended this provision until
future Cortes determined that the time had come
to put it into effect, it is clear that the principle of
distinction was in place (GARCÍA, 1978, p. 8).
On May 23, 1812 the Cortes issued a decree
setting down the instructions for the first
elections. In regard to New Spain, it provided
that a meeting of officials should be held in
Mexico City prior to elections. The province of
Mexico was to elect fourteen deputies and four
alternates to the Cortes and one deputy and one
alternate to the provincial deputation. The parish
elections in Mexico City were set for November
29, 1812. The provincial electors of the provinces
of Mexico were to meet in Mexico City on
February 1, 1813.
Acording to Benson electoral provisions “were
observed in the elections held in Mexico City on
November 29, 1812. Not one judge reported
unruliness or disorderly conduct on the part of
the electorate during the proceedings. On the
contrary, they unanimously stated that the parish
meetings were executed in the midst of the
greatest tranquillity and order” (BENSON, 1946).
All those elected were from well-known families
of Mexico City. However all the electors were
American-born or creoles. There were popular
demonstrations of joy that lasted until the next
morning (GUEDEA, 2001, p. 54-56). A few days
after the municipal elections newspapers in
Mexico City published critical accounts of the
process (BENSON, 1946, p. 342)9. The daily
complained that lists with the names of electors
had been widely distributed beforehand. Also,
persons not entitled to vote had participated. The
Audiencia of Mexico complained to the Spanish
Cortes in similar terms in November 1813. It
seems that the cause of most of these allegations
was that “not a single European Spaniard nor a
single person who supported the Europeans was
elected” (idem, p. 349). Those elected were not
followers of the colonial government. Some were
active sympathizers of the rebels. In response to
this defeat the Viceroy suspended the second stage
of the electoral process and launched an
investigation on the manner the election had been
conducted. Freedom of the press was suppressed.
It was clear that both, the results of the election
and the popular mobilization it produced alarmed
the colonial authorities.
The November 1812 election was modern in
many ways. There were two well organized
competing parties: the American-born creoles and
the Europeans. Both followed the same electoral
tactics of distributing lists of candidates to voters
7  According to Rodríguez, those elections were based
“on the municipal elections of diputados del común y
síndicos personeros introduced by Carlos III in the
municipal reforms of 1766” (RODRÍGUEZ, 2008, p. 105).
8  Spaniards of African descent could become citizens by
means of “virtue and merit” (Art. 22).
9  “Sobre el nombramiento de elecciones municipales”, El
amigo de la patria quoted by Benson (1946, p. 342).
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beforehand. The factions employed individuals to
distribute their lists among the people. Many
voters did not know the names that were written
on the lists they presented. However, the
American faction proved much more effective at
this game than its counterpart. It achieved an
absolute victory. The distribution of lists was not
illegal under the constitution although many actors
viewed it as collusion. At the same time, popular
participation was extensive and included
individuals that according to the constitution could
not vote, such as blacks, castes, domestic
servants, vagrants and debtors (GUEDEA, 1991a,
p. 2-15). These individuals wanted to participate
in the election and in most cases were successful.
Interestingly enough the losing side, although in
power, did not subvert the process. While the
electoral process was temporarily suspended it
resumed eventually. In the end the electoral
organizing of the Creoles prevailed and their
faction won again the majority of electors. It is
noteworthy that, according to Guerra, in that early
election most inhabitants in the census of Mexico
City were considered citizens (91%). The
franchise was nearly universal. Indeed, 93% of
the male population were citizens (GUERRA,
1999).
The insurgents also carried out elections in
the territories they held; first to elect a Junta
Provincial and, later, a Congress. With some
modifications the rebels followed the Cádiz model
(GUEDEA, 1991b, p. 238). Those electoral
experiences will no be discussed here (GUEDEA,
1991a; AVILA, 1999). In 1820 the Cádiz
Constitution, which had been suspended by
Fernando VII in 1814, was restored. The decree
calling for elections for the Cortes was published
in Mexico on June 3, 1820. A census of voters
was made and elections for the Mexico province
were held. As before 1814, the majority of those
elected as first degree electors were Americans.
Likewise, when the electors of partido convened
to elect representatives on September 17, 1820
most seats were taken by creoles (AVILA, 1999,
p. 190-195). Lucas Alamán, the future leader of
the Conservative party, was elected as a
representative from Guanajuato. In other
provinces elections followed a similar pattern. The
ayuntamientos constitucionales were restored as
well as seven diputaciones provinciales. The
elections of 1820-1821 were criticized for
technical infractions, “but there were no events
similar to the upheavals of 1812. The most salient
characteristic of both the Cortes and municipal
council elections in 1820-1821 was the low voter
tournout. Parish returns showed dramatic
absenteeism” (WARREN, 1996, p. 40). Yet, on
February 24, 1821 a Spanish army officer,
Agustín de Iturbide, turned coats and sided with
the insurgente leader, Vicente Guerrero, and
declared independence from Spain. As Warren
states, “the ideological debates and electoral
experiences of the independence era strongly
influenced the nation’s development during the
next generation. Moreover, elites and masses
learned that elections could trigger general political
ferment” (ibidem).
The legacy of the Cádiz constitution was
twofold. On the one hand, the 1812 constitution
provided the frame of an expanded franchise that
would be very difficult to restrict in the new
republic. On the other hand the Cádiz scheme of
indirect elections proved to be long-lived. In
Mexico, it lasted for many years until the 20th
century. These legacies had significant political
consequences. Three aspects are significant and
survived until the 20th century. First, the procedure
that allowed the polling tables to decide, without
appeal, any complaint or issue during the voting.
Second, the fact that secondary electors were not
bound to obey primary voters and finally, the role
of “jefes políticos”. In Mexico Jefes politicos
became key players after 1857 (VARELA
ORTEGA & MEDINA PEÑA, 2000, p. 209-213).
III. THE SHORT ROAD HOME: VOTING
RIGHTS AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
The right to vote did not develop in a
straightforward manner in Mexico during the 19th
century. As we have seen, the Cádiz Constitution
awarded full citizenship to most men with
“employment, trade or a known way of living”
(Art. 25). While the 1812 Constitution did not
provide for universal male suffrage (domestic
servants, descendants of blacks and castes were
excluded), the electoral procedures permitted a
wide interpretation of the law10. Once
independence was achieved suffrage was granted
10  The articles on citizenship were strikingly vague.
Citizens were defined as those who “have their origin in
the Spanish dominions of both hemispheres” and were
settled in any village. Since there was no voter’s list and
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to citizens over 18 years of age of all classes and
castes, even foreigners. The November 17, 1821
“Convocatoria a Cortes” to a constituent Congress
also broadened the franchise by eliminating racial
requirements for citizenship (GARCÍA, 1978, p.
29; PANI, 2003, p. 97-100). Later, when the
republic was established, the 1824 federal
constitution left the determination of who could
vote to the state legislatures (AGUILAR RIVERA,
2000, p. 156-157).  However, we know that the
first state constitutions (1824-1828) defined
citizens as male, ideally pater familias. Nine states
awarded citizenship to married men even if they
were under the set age (PANI, 2003, p. 65-113).
Men required a known address and a known mode
of living. Many state charters excluded morally
of physically unfit individuals: convicted felons,
debtors, drunkards. Eleven states denied
citizenship to domestic servants. Only three states,
Mexico, Occidente and Querétaro, deprived the
clergy of their political rights. Most states set
reading and writing as a condition for voters and
candidates but postponed enforcement until a time
(ranging between 1835 and 1850) when
enlightenment was widely distributed in the land.
As Erika Pani asserts, some states suspended
political rights to “ungrateful children” to their
parents, and to husbands whom left their wives
and to professional gamblers. Vagrants and
persons who used to wander “shamefully naked”
also were excluded in some places. In contrast,
only six states punished selling or buying votes
with the suspension of political rights. Two states
required citizens to enroll in the militia and only
one demanded citizens to register in the municipal
census. Remarkably, only the state of Nuevo León
established that in “due time” Congress would
establish a minimum tax amount to determine
eligibility to full citizenship.
This is surprising since in the 1823-1824
constituent Congress deputies were generally in
favor of establishing a property condition for
voters. A 1 000 pesos amount was proposed by
the commission in the draft of the constitution.
Yet, two objections were put forth. First, as in
the debates in Philadelphia on the same issue, this
amount was either too low or too high. Therefore,
every state was to establish its own qualifications.
As one deputy put it: “it is most convenient that
every legislature enacts its own regulation in
accordance to its own climate and circumstances,
since in some states those with a property worth
25 000 pesos will have the right to vote, while in
other states those that have more or less [property]
will have the vote” (AGUILAR RIVERA, 2000,
p. 162). Secondly, some deputies objected to the
property qualification because of the unequal
wealth distribution obtained during Spanish
colonial rule. Property was in the hands of a few
individuals. Thus, as we have seen it is quite
remarkable that once state legislatures drafted their
constitutions they omitted property conditions.
For Mexican constitution-makers, unlike their
northern neighbors “political community should
not be structured around property or income, not
even around assessable contributions in the form
of taxes […] neither on enlightenment or civic
virtues” (PANI, 2003, p. 91). As Pani asserts, a
good citizen was a morally “good” man, a head
of family, “firm and solvent”, known as such by
his neighbors (idem, p. 90).
On June 17, 1823 an electoral law11 to elect a
new constituent Congress was published
(GARCÍA, 1978, p. 33-42). The Cadiz
arrangement of indirect elections in three degrees
as well as the religious prolegomenon was
retained (idem, p. 34)12. The wide franchise was
also kept: all able men of 18 years of age were
enfranchised. However, alleged criminals, debtors,
those with an “unknown way of living or
residence” and domestic servants were excluded
(idem, Art. 17). Note that this piece of legislation,
unlike the 1812 Cádiz constitution, did not follow
the “principle of distinction”. No income or
property qualification was required from deputies.
With the exception of age and residence voters,the vecinos at the polling table were the ones who
determined who could vote the result was virtual universal
male suffrage. From the records of the 1812-1814 elections
we can see that few voters were turned down at the polling
tables. Meanwhile, as we have seen a standard complaint
of that period was that ineligible people voted at the
elections. Note however, that in theory this procedure
could have worked the other way around, restricting
suffrage.
11  It was callded “Bases para las Elecciones del Nuevo
Congreso”, of 17 June, 1823.
12  Art. 13 “Serán precedidas de rogación pública  en las
catedrales y parroquias, implorando el auxilio divino para
el acierto” (GARCÍA, 1978, p. 34).
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electors (primary and secondary) and deputies
were very much alike13. Thus, while there were
some changes in the electoral law (representation
by classes was eliminated) voter eligibility
continued under the terms set forth by Iturbide14.
No restriction to the vote was to be imposed
until 1836. However, as we shall see, in 1830
some new electoral procedures were put in place
at the federal level in order to achieve greater
control of elections. Electoral units were
downsized from large parishes to small manzanas
that carried their own primary elections15. Also
officials were appointed to conduct electoral
census. These measures attempted to curb
practices which were common, such as the
distribution of lists. On November 30, 1836, six
years later and a few rebellions, a new electoral
law was passed.  Political elites seemed to have
reached a consensus: they would abstain from
tapping into the popular classes in their struggles.
Only neighbors with an annual income (rents,
salaries) of at least one hundred pesos would now
be allowed to vote (idem, p. 58). Previous
exclusions were maintained (domestic servants,
criminals, debtors, clerics etc.) Indirect elections
in three degrees were also preserved16. Some
states had started to impose property or income
restriction even before 1836. Between 1830 and
1832 states such as Veracruz and Guanajuato
imposed different restrictions (SERRANO &
CHUST, 2008, p. 221-222).
Having reached a provisional agreement
regarding the exclusion of the “dangerous classes”
it is sensible to assume that such consensus
among the political elites would last for many
years, until democratic pressures resulted in the
gradual opening of the franchise. However, that
was not the case in Mexico. Only five years after
the electoral law of November 1836 was enacted
a coalition of disgruntled merchants and generals
(among them Santa Anna and Paredes Arrillaga)
was formed to oust (for the second time) President
Anastasio Bustamante17. Santa Anna suspended
de 1836 centralist constitution and proposed to
convene a constituent Congress based on a new
electoral law. A committee was appointed to draft
the new legislation. The authors suggested that
the June 1823 electoral law “be reinstated because
of its ‘greater acceptance’ among the people. The
more restrictive laws of 1830 and 1836 were
reviewed, the motivations of their perpetrators
questioned, and their results condemned. The
committee denounced as ‘pretexts of deception’
the efforts to blame instability on the ‘natural
character’ of a new nation, and the laws of 1830
and 1836 were described as a desperate effort to
13  Art. 69: “To become deputy it is required to be a
citizen in good standing, over 20 years of age, born in the
province or having been in residence for at least seven
years”. Lay persons as well as secular members of the
church, members of the provincial Junta as well as non
members could become deputies. Oddly enough, there
were more restrictions for secondary electors than for
deputies. Secondary electors had to be at least 25 years of
age with a five year residence in the “partido”. Civil,
military and e cclesiastic magistrates were excluded as
well as priests.  Primary electors had to be at least 25
years of age (or 21 if married), neighbor and resident of
the municipality. Civil, military and ecclesiastic magistrates
were excluded as well as priests. However, elected
authorities, such as mayors, were eligible (GÓMEZ, 2005,
p. 36-37, 39). The 1823 law imposed more conditions for
primary electors than those imposed on parish electors
by the 1812 Cádiz Constitution (on which it was modeled
after) which (Art. 75), only required full citizenship, 25
years of age and the condition of neighbor and resident
(Art. 45). According to the Spanish Constitution,
secondary electors, in addition to the requirements for
primary electors, could be laymen or secular ecclesiastics.
Members as well as non-members of the partido Junta
could be elected.
14  When the idea of electing a constituent congress was
discussed in 1821, Iturbide proposed that the assembly
be filled with representatives of different “classes”
according to their importance and influence. The assembly
would be composed of 114 citizens plus nine clergy, nine
military, nine magistrates, nine lawyers, two farmers, two
employees, two artisans, two miners, one “title” and one
mayorazgo. This design sought to include significant
interest groups. Oddly, this proposal was neither
traditional nor modern. It was not Spanish corporatist
but clearly was out of touch with modern representative
government.
15  A “manzana” was roughly a city “block”.
16  Indirect elections remained in place in Mexico until
1911. The three-stage Cádiz model was in place until
1857 and from then on there was a two-stage system
(VARELA ORTEGA & MEDINA PEÑA, 2000, p. 208).
17  Bustamante was in power for the first time between
1830 and 1832 (January 1, 1830 to August 30, 1832),
later in 1837 he was elected to the presidency. He served
as President, from April 19 1837 until September 22 1841
with a brief four months interruption (March 18, 1839 to
July 18, 1839), when he was toppled by Santa Anna and
Paredes Arrillaga.
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control, electoral outcomes and deny the popular
will” (OROZCO, 1978, p. 71-80). The electoral
decree of December 10, 1841 removed income
qualifications for voters but preserved a property
restriction for deputies (ibidem)18. Small electoral
units, a required census and the distribution of
ballots by electoral commissioners, all provided
by the 1830 law, were preserved.  Also, there
were some differences in the conditions imposed
on primary and secondary electors (WARREN,
1996, p. 51).
The strategy of restricting the franchise was
not a stable equilibrium among political elites. In
the next five years income qualifications to voters
were repealed and adopted again several times.
Why was the consensus to exclude the lower
classes from the elections so weak? Perhaps, the
temptation of employing popular mobilization was
very strong. After a few years Santa Anna realized
that he was depriving himself of a valuable
weapon: the popular vote19. Not all the elites
agreed on this point. There is evidence that many
in the provinces wanted property or income and
literacy qualifications for voters and candidates
and supported the idea of the representatives being
restricted to heads of family (COSTELOE, 1989,
p. 260).  Other ideas took shape: the departments
now asked for equality of representation
regardless of population. They demanded four
deputies from each of the 24 departments
regardless of size of population. The committee
adopted many of the suggestions, particularly that
population should no longer determine the number
of deputies and that each department should be
allocated four deputies. However Santa Anna did
not accept the committee’s report. He instead
imposed by decree the electoral regulations of
December 1841 that excluded these innovations.
Santa Anna “had clearly rejected the demands
from the provinces to restrict the franchise. There
was to be no literacy test, property or income
qualification for voters, and had resisted the
considerable pressure to grant equality of
representation in the Congress for all departments
irrespective of their size or population” (idem, p.
262). Indeed, Santa Anna’s behavior is difficult
to explain. As Costeloe suggest, miscalculation
might be the answer. Santa Anna presumably
resisted the pressure of the regions for a more
restricted franchise because he believed that he
could and would win the elections through
mobilizing the popular vote despite the fact that
he made no effort to build a political constituency
of his own (idem, p. 269). He was wrong.
The Congress met in June 1842 produced a
draft constitution that Santa Anna disliked and,
after a pronunciamiento took place, he closed the
Congress in December. The way was opened for
an advisory council chosen by him to endow him
with dictatorial powers. The Junta Nacional
Legislativa drafted a centralist constitution, the
1843 Bases Orgánicas. Under the electoral
provisions of the Bases, Santa Anna was elected
President and was inaugurated in 1844. As it had
been since 1830, electoral sections were small
(500 inhabitants). A bicameral legislative was
established. Elections were indirect in three
stages. Citizenship was restricted to males, 21
years of age (or 18 if they were married) with an
annual income of at least 200 pesos. Future
congresses could adjust this amount to the
conditions of each of the departments to enjoy
full rights of citizenship. Registering in the
electoral census, voting and serving were duties
imposed on citizens (GARCÍA, 1978, p. 80-83).
In addition, a condition of literacy would be added
starting in 1850. Secondary electors were required
an income of 500 pesos but Congress could
change this amount in the future. Deputies had to
be at least 30 years of age and have an annual
income of at least 1 200 pesos. Senators should
be at least 35 years of age and have a substantial
annual income of at least 2 000 pesos. The Senate
was conceived as representing interests, similar
to earlier Iturbide’s proposal. Two-thirds (42) of
the 63-members chamber were to be elected by
the departmental assemblies. However, they were
required by the charter to elect five individuals of
each of the following classes: farmers, miners,
property-holders or merchants and manufactu-
18  An exclusion was added: regular clergymen could not
vote. Primary electors, unlike regular citizens, had to be
at least 21 years old, they had to be neighbors and residents
of the municipality and magistrates were excluded. Besides
these qualifications, secondary electors had to be at least
25 years of age and residents for at least one year in the
municipality. Finally, deputies had to have two years of
residence and an annual income of at least 1 500 pesos.
Married men, widowers  and heads of families were to be
preferred to single men (OROZCO, 1978, p. 74-77).
19  However, if this is the case why was the income
restriction to candidates preserved?
47
REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA E POLÍTICA V. 20, Nº 42: 39-55 JUN. 2012
rers. These individuals were exempt from the 2
000 pesos income qualification. The remaining
senators were to be former presidents, vice presi-
dents, two-time deputies, ministers, ambassadors,
state governors, bishops or division generals.
Santa Anna ruled the country until December
1844, when his government was toppled by a
coup orchestrated by disaffected politicians.
Congress appointed Joaquín de Herrera in his
place. He, in turn, was ousted in December 1845
by Gen. Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. The war
with the United States began in 1846 and in April
Gen. Álvarez rebelled against the government in
the south of the country. Likewise, on August 6,
1846 Gen. Mariano Salas issued a
pronunciamiento in Mexico City. The Plan de la
Ciudadela called for the convocation of a new
constituent Congress. Paredes was toppled on
August 6, 1846 in the midst of the war against
the Americans. On August 6, 1846 the
convocatoria was issued. The electoral law to be
used to elect the Congress was the June 17, 1823,
with certain amendments (idem, p. 111-119).  The
broad franchise of the early Federal Republic was
reinstated. On August 22, 1846 the 1824
constitution was restored. Elections to elect an
extraordinary Congress were held at the end of
1846. The electoral law used was the inclusive
December 10, 1841 law. The new constituent
Congress restored the 1824 constitution. An Act
of Reforms (amendments) was attached to the
charter. The Act of Amedments, authored by
liberal Mariano Otero, was approved on May, 18,
1847. It asserted that: “every Mexican national,
either by birth or by naturalization, of 20 years of
age, that has an honest mode of subsistence, and
that has not been convicted of a criminal offense,
is a citizen of the Mexican United States”.
Likewise, article 2 stated that citizens had the
“right to vote in popular elections” (MEXICO,
1847)20. On June 3, 1847, a new electoral law
was passed by the constituent Congress that
followed the provisions of both, the Acta de
Reformas and the December 10, 1841 law
(GARCÍA, 1978, p. 120-122). It established
nearly universal male suffrage. Thus Mexico,
Greece and El Salvador, became the only countries
“with broad male suffrage as of 1847”
(PRZEWORSKI, 2010, p. 50).
All in all, between 1821 and 1857 income
restrictions to voters had been in effect less than
nine years21. Income or property qualifications
were never imposed again in the 19th century.
Yet the condition of “having a known means of
subsistence” or an “honest means of subsistence”
was not challenged. The 1857 constitution
enshrined universal male suffrage and provided
that the only conditions to citizenship were age
(20 years if single, 18 if married) and having an
honest mode of living (Art. 34) (GARCÍA, 1978,
p. 55, 155). In the 1856-1857 Constituent
Congress there was debate over the proposal of
imposing a literacy condition to the right to vote.
Also, indirect elections were challenged by some
constitution-makers. To the question: who is to
control electoral procedures they offered different
answers For some, such as Francisco Zarco and
Ignacio Ramírez indirect elections deceived the
people. Others, alleged that the time to establish
direct elections had not come, since priests still
were very influential with the people (VARELA
& MEDINA, 2000, p. 206). The second group
prevailed and indirect elections were adopted for
representatives, justices and the executive, but
with one change: there were to be two instead of
three stages (arts. 55, 76 and 92). Indirect
elections in two stages were in place in Mexico
until 1911. Thus, for very long time male universal
suffrage coexisted with indirect elections.
However, interestingly enough, after 1857 many
state constitutions often provided for direct
20  “Art. 1° Todo mexicano, por nacimiento ó por
naturalización, que haya llegado á la edad de veinte años,
que tenga modo honesto de vivir, y que no haya sido
condenado en proceso legal á alguna pena infamante, es
ciudadano de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos. Art. 2° Es
derecho de los ciudadanos votar en las elecciones
populares, ejercer el de petición, reunirse para discutir los
negocios públicos, y pertenecer á la Guardia Nacional,
todo conforme á las leyes. Art. 3° El ejercicio de los
derechos de ciudadano se suspende por ser ebrio
consuetudinario, ó tahur de profesion, ó vago; por el estado
religioso, por el de interdicción legal; en virtud de proceso
sobre aquellos delitos por los cuales se pierde la cualidad
de ciudadano, y por rehusarse, sin excusa legítima, á servir
los cargos públicos de nombramiento popular” (MEXICO,
1847, arts. 1-3).
21  Property restrictions were in place in Mexico during
the central republic during the following periods: between
November 30, 1836 and December 10, 1841 and between
June 14, 1843 and August 6, 1846.
48
BEYOND THE RESTRICTIVE CONSENSUS: ELECTIONS IN MEXICO (1809-1847)
election: in 13 states the local Congress and the
governor were elected by “direct and popular
vote” (CARMAGNANI, 1991, p. 235)22.
IV. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE  ELITIST
CONSENSUS: ELECTORAL PRACTICES
AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION
In spite of the fact that the voting franchise
was expanded in 1821 and 1823, (with the
elimination of the racial restrictions of the Cádiz
charter) at the beginning of the republican period,
participation declined in the first elections as an
independent nation. However, the lack of a racial
restriction made possible the careers of
politicians such as Benito Juárez, a Zapotec
Indian.  For instance, in the parish of Sagrario
of Mexico City 5,392 citizens voted in the 1812
municipal council primary elections while only
412 persons voted in 1823. Yet, this quickly
changed after 1824.  In the 1826 Mexico City’s
congressional primary election 30 000 ballots
were cast in. According to Warren, political
ferment, like that of 1812, was “directly related
to the organizing initiatives of an aspiring elite
faction: radical federalists organized in York rite
Masonic lodges” (WARREN, 1996, p. 42). It
seems that right from the Cadiz experiments
mobilization did not depend on the opportunity
to vote, in terms of enfranchisement, but was
instead triggered by party politics. In 1826
Yorkino machinations were extremely successful
as an unprecedented number of ballots were
counted, and their candidates dominated as
primary electors. Opponents claimed the
yorkinos purchased votes and used urban mobs
for political ends. The Scottish rite followers
accused the yorkinos of purchasing and
destroying escocés candidates lists in poor
neighborhoods. The game of mobilizing popular
support was played by the two major political
factions. This helps to explain the “size and
intensity” of popular participation.
Factional conflict did no cease after the 1826
congressional elections. It deepened and reached
a climax two years later, in the 1828 presidential
elections23. This election might be considered a
“critical juncture”. Until that election both factions
shared cabinet posts as well as other power
positions in the national government of gen.
Guadalupe Victoria. The yorkino candidate, Gen.
Vicente Guerrero, lost the election and a few
months later constitutional regularity broke down
(DI TELLA, 1994, p. 200-225). The escocés Manuel
Gómez Pedraza was elected President, but before
his inauguration took place a revolt broke out in
Mexico City. Gómez Pedraza was prevented from
assuming office and Congress elected the defeated
candidate, Guerrero, as President.
Why did Guerrero subvert the constitutional
order? This is a key episode in the development of
elections and representative government in Mexico.
A new presidential election was scheduled in 1832,
four years later. In the hotly contested elections of
1826 and 1828 turnout may have been as high as
75% of the adult male population (WARREN, 2001,
p. 164). A possible answer is that, along with
yorkino recklessness, popular mobilization went
out of control. Indeed, on December 4 1828, when
Gómez Pedraza was about to capitulate, and in a
frenzy of popular and military resentment against
the Spaniards, “a mob descended on the Parián
market and pillaged its shops as well as a number
of homes and businesses elsewhere in the city
center. Estimates of the number of participants in
the riot range up to several thousand. The upheaval
drove most people of means off the streets for
several days, including the municipal council
officers who were supposed to preserve public
tranquility”. Thus, the Parián riot in Mexico City
became the great symbol of 1820s popular
radicalism. Conservatives claimed that the Parián
booty was offered as a reward to the poor for
supporting Guerrero. The looting itself confirmed
conservative fears of the relationship between
popular political participation and social dissolution,
while radicals explained the event as an
“understandable response to three hundred years
of Spanish oppression and the repeated aristocratic
conspiracies of the post-independence era
promulgated by those who survived off the sweat
of the Mexican people” (ibidem). Mexico City’s22  Even before 1857, in  the first state constitutions of
the 1820, there were some departures from the Cadiz
model. For instance, there were different mechanisms to
elect governors. In some states the local executive was
elected by municipal councils (ayuntamientos), while in
others it was elected by the local congress and yet in
others it was elected by electoral colleges.
23  While the executive was chosen by the state
legislatures, “the uses of popular pressure had become an
essential element of contemporary politics” (WARREN,
1996, p. 44).
49
REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA E POLÍTICA V. 20, Nº 42: 39-55 JUN. 2012
largest uprising in over one hundred years came
about directly as a result of partisan politics. Also
it came about as the failure of elections to channel
political participation. While the 1828 election was
not the first election in which party politics and
mass mobilization intersected (as we have seen the
1812 election exhibited both traits), it was the first
in which losers had enough incentives (and means)
to subvert the process24. They were indeed
successful in their attempt of altering the formal
outcome of the elections. The background of
constitutional breakdown was the poor state of the
economy, xenophobic agitation against the
Spaniards and miners unrest. However, many
among the political elites saw the Parián riot
basically as the inevitable result of the political
enfranchisement of the urban poor. Something
close to a consensus emerged. Thus the movement
towards restricting the vote began.
After Guerrero was deposed in 1829 by a
pronunciamiento in the city of Jalapa the Vice
President, General Anastasio Bustamante, took
charge of the presidency and Lucas Alamán became
Minister of the Interior. In his first ministerial report
to Congress, submitted in February 1830, Alamán
singled out the causes of the ills of the country.
The system of elections came only second after
secret societies. Alamán criticized that during
elections the factions distributed lists of candidates,
secured for themselves the positions of secretary
and inspector at the polling tables, thereafter every
person, regardless of qualifications, was allowed
to vote sometimes more than one time. He believed
these practices made judicious men turn away from
elections, leaving the field in the hands of those
less able of conducting them with tact. The “spirit
of party” went so far as to consider property and
enlightenment as aristocratic and excluding them
from elections. Such qualities were the “sole basis
of a truly representative system” (ALAMÁN, 1945,
p. 183-185)25.
Alamán was not alone in his criticism of
elections. José María Luis Mora, a luminary of
the liberal party, was very much in agreement with
him. Two months after Alamán gave his report,
Mora published an extended article in the daily El
Observador in which he argued for the
establishment of property qualifications (MORA,
1994, p. 136-145)26. Mora suggested a minimum
income requirement of 1 000 pesos annually or
real state property worth 6 000 pesos. Such
amounts would be cut in half in the countryside
and in towns with less than 10 000 inhabitants.
Mora also argued for a uniform national
citizenship. National citizenship would be a
requirement to acquire state citizenship.
However, Mora’s proposal was not adopted
by the Bustamante government, which had its
own ideas on electoral reform (WARREN, 1996,
p. 45). As we have seen, in July 1830 the
government persuaded Congress to pass a major
electoral reform bill for the Federal District and
Territories intended to restrict access to the ballot
box. However, no income restriction was adopted.
The basic electoral units for the Federal District
were changed from the 14 parishes to 245 small
manzanas27.
24  Nothing comparable to the Parián riot came about
even during the more critical moments of the November
1812 election in Mexico City.
25  Often men were elected who did not depend on society
by any bond, and whom “having nothing aspired to gaining
everything” without scruples. Because of these facts,
Alamán, asserted, elections often lacked legitimacy. Since
political authority had been weakened by revolution only
“immaculate” electoral processes could endow such
authorities with sufficient legitimacy.
26  Mora blamed much of Mexico’s instability on a
misguided notion of equality. There had been a “scandalous
profusion” of political rights that had allowed even the
lowest classes of society participation in elections. Spain,
Portugal, Naples and “all the new republics of America
that adopted the principles of the Spanish constitution of
extending the exercise of political rights to non property
holders have marched relentlessly from one revolution to
the other” (MORA, 1994). In contrast, Mora admired the
electoral systems of the United States, Britain and Holland
because of the stability of those systems which he attributed
to a restricted franchise. Mora published a series of
interesting articles regarding elections: Mora (1830a; 1830b).
27  Under the new system, each of the 245 manzanas
would have its own primary election, “short-circuiting
the mass production of printed candidates lists and the
possibility of gathering large groups at the polls”.
Moreover, each manzana would have one electoral
commissioner, an official designated by the municipal
council to conduct a neighborhood census and distribute
ballots to eligible voters well before election day. This
measure was designed to cut down on multiple voting by
individuals and ineligible persons. The municipal council
now controlled the appointment of electoral
commissioners, who in turn conducted the electoral census,
handing out or denying ballots “to whomever they chose
and, significantly, reporting vagrants (whom would not
be able to vote) to the police” (WARREN, 1996, p. 5).
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The following year Alamán optimistically
reported to Congress that the new law had “cut
from the root the abuses in popular elections”
(ALAMÁN, 1945, p. 26)28.  However, as Warren
notes, the change in administrative apparatus did
not interrupt the electoral process much at first
and the transition to the manzana system “did not
result in an immediate decline in voter turnout,
either. Aggregate turnout in municipal elections
was virtually the same in 1830 (12 218) and 1831
(12 581) as it was in 1829 (13 028), prior to the
change in the law” (WARREN, 1996, 45-46).
Under the new system, however, commissioners
fared very well. In most manzanas the
commissioners won the primary elections. In 1831
approximately 45 per cent of the winners were
commissioners. Thus this shows that they became
key political operatives. The elections of 1830 and
1831 demonstrated that the 1830 electoral reform
“was not sufficient to curtail voter turnout or
secure conservative victory” (ibidem).
In the 1832 municipal elections of Mexico City
prominent  liberals claimed that the elections had
been conducted in an atmosphere of fear, which
brought into office persons who did not merit
the “confidence of the people”. A new revolt
staged by a liberal coalition allied with Santa Anna
ousted Bustamante and Alamán from power. The
new administration, headed by the Vice President
Valentín Gómez Farías, dissolved the sitting
municipal council and summoned the 1829
members to return. Once more, formal results of
the elections were reversed. This had an adverse
effect on electoral participation. The 1833
municipal election was “marked by widespread
absenteeism”. The new government blamed the
1830 law for the decrease in participation. Vice
President Gómez Farías, a liberal, was resolved
to prosecute the ministers of the deposed
Bustamante administration, in particular Alamán,
who went into hiding to avoid arrest. There the
ex minister wrote an account of the flaws of the
1824 constitution (ALAMÁN, 2008)29.
From 1833 to 1835 political apathy continued.
Electoral reform was a priority in 1835 when the
centralists won power and decided to draft a new
constitution. They introduced the first income
restrictions on the suffrage shortly thereafter.
Why? Absenteeism was undeniable. In the 1835
Mexico City elections only 32 manzanas out of
60 held elections. According to the electoral
census, turnout was 23.6%. In the manzanas that
had elections turnout was 27.7%. However the
key was in who voted. According to Warren, the
breakdown of voters by profession shows a
surprising, but undeniable pattern: “there was a
high participation rate by poorer artisans and
manual laborers. Shoemakers and carpenters as
well as load bearers, water carriers and
bricklayers voted in significant numbers. In
manzanas with elections, more than 47% of water
carriers and more than 37% of carpenters and
bricklayers cast votes, versus the overall voter
turnout of 27.7%” (WARREN, 1996, p. 47)30.
In 1835 the main electoral constituency were the
poor.
Elections were seen by many prominent actors
as key to explaining the ills of the country. By
early 1846 Mexico had been celebrating elections
for more than 30 years.  In 1836, after 15 years
of experimenting with an expansive franchise,
Mexican elites decided, for the first time, to
impose income or property qualifications for
voters. At the beginning of the early republican
period representation was so democratic that not
even the principle of distinction, key to
representative government, was followed. This
is quite different from what happened in older
representative governments. In Mexico City
turnout for municipal elections in the period from
1829 to 1831 hovered around 27% of the city’s
estimated total male population (idem, p. 161). It
had taken years to political elites to agree on the
need to restrict the franchise. Much had been
expected from elections. Now, a peculiar disbelief
captured the minds of some long-standing
observers and participants. The prospect of
28  While the law had some flaws these would in time be
corrected. The problem now, he pointed out, was that
voters did not vote. To correct this he proposed to fine
absentee voters. Alamán proposed to fine absentee voters
with 2 to 10 pesos.
29  In his account Alamán sided with Mora. Income or
property restrictions to voters were never as necessary
as when a new nation adopted the representative
government for the first time. He also criticized indirect
elections. As a filter of the popular will they were useless,
he argued, since the qualifications for primary and
secondary electors were the same.
30  “Ley sobre elecciones de diputados para el Congreso
general, y de los individuos que compongan las juntas
departamentales” (GARCÍA, 1978, p. 58).
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reforming the electoral system looked grim.
Adopting long overdue income restrictions to the
franchise had clearly not been enough to “fix”
the system. Besides, as events had shown, such
restrictions did not constitute a stable equilibrium,
since many political actors from all factions had
incentives to deviate from it. Mass politics was a
valuable resource and it was hard to abstain from
it. Thus, Alamán and other conservatives reached
the conclusion that not even indirect, income-
restricted, elections would do. They believed that
something else had to be tried, a new system
different from those of England, the U.S. and
France. In designing this original system he tapped
into ideas of class and interest representation
already contained in the 1821 Iturbide’s
convocation and in the 1843 Bases Orgánicas.
Only this time he took his proposal even farther
away from standard theories of representation
(VÁZQUEZ, 1999, p. 122). To preserve order
and stability a corporatist representation system
would be established31. This project was afforded
little time since as we have seen, the Paredes
government was ousted only seven months after
the publication of the convocatoria. The federal
republic – and its electoral regime – were restored.
Alamán saw these developments as a return to
the stormy 1820’s, an era of mass elections that
he decried. Riots had gripped Mexico City in
1838, 1841 and 1844 (WARREN, 1996, p. 169).
Further radicalization ensued in the following
years. Thus, four years later, in 1853, he
complained to Santa Anna that the conservative
party, which he now led, was set against the
representative system, “against elective
townships, and against everything called popular
election until the time where they lay on a different
foundation” (ALAMÁN, 1986, p. 313-17).
V. CONCLUSIONS: MACHINE POLITICS IN
MEXICO
After the Reform War (1857-1861) and the
fall of the Second Empire (1863-1867) liberals
enjoyed political supremacy. As we have seen,
from the beginning of the republican period an
expanded franchise was the product of political
competition between the elites that actively used
the popular classes in the factional struggles.
However, elites also wanted to preserve control
over electoral process, thus the long-lived system
of indirect elections. This case seems to run
counter to some social science explanations of how
the franchise expanded (ACEMOLGLU &
ROBINSON, 2006). During the era of the Restored
Republic (1867-1876) elections became contests
between the federal and local governments. The
electoral system empowered local authorities, since
prior to the biennial federal elections, the municipal
councils designated the electoral census takers,
polling sites, and a citizen charged with setting up
the polling table (VARELA ORTEGA & MEDINA
PEÑA, 2000, p. 210-211)32. Thus the national
government competed with local politicians for the
control of voters and electors. Presidents during
the Restored Republic need governors if they
wanted to be reelected. Some governors
cooperated, other did not. When presidents, such
as Benito Juárez, faced a hostile governor they
frequently resorted to military intervention to
depose it and place a factional ally. Governors
were key to decide elections because they in turn
controlled the “jefes politicos”, officials created
by the Cádiz constitution that had authority over
local mayors. Juarez and his ally, Sebastián Lerdo
de Tejada, controlled the majority of governors.
In this way they were able to prevent Díaz, who
had few governors, from winning an election. The
result was the failed 1871 Díaz rebellion. A key
complaint was that Juárez used his factional allies
to make a travesty of elections. Díaz could not
defeat the electoral machine. Thus, as Medina
asserts, the Díaz 1871 and 1876 rebellions, as
well as the 1910 Francisco I. Madero revolution,
were directed against the “use and abuse” of
31  The proposed electoral system was detailed and
extremely complex. Congress would be composed of 160
deputies to be distributed among nine different classes:
country and urban property and agricultural industry, (38
deputies) trade (20 deputies), mining (14 deputies),
manufacturing (14 deputies), literary professions (14
deputies), magistracy (10 deputies), public administration
(10 deputies), clergy (20 deputies) and the Army (20
deputies).
32  The polling station was completed with the first seven
citizens that showed up. These citizens designated a
President, a secretary and the inspectors. The officials
took the ballots where the citizens had written the names
of their preferred elector. Following the Cadiz model, the
polling table could decide, without appeal, any complaint
on the election. After these vote section electors traveled
to the capital of the district. There they voted with secret
ballots to elect the deputies. Candidates had to carry an
absolute majority of electoral votes. Similar procedures
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electoral rules. In 1876 Juárez was dead and Lerdo
could not keep the machine together. Fraud
prevailed and Díaz rebelled again, this time he was
successful in toppling the government. He would
construct his own electoral machine that lasted
for 34 years, until it, too, crashed.
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ABSTRACTS
BEYOND THE RESTRICTIVE CONSENSUS: ELECTIONS IN MEXICO (1809-1847)
José Antonio Aguilar Rivera
This essay looks at experiments with a system of representation taking place in New Spain and later
in Mexico. The elections that were carried out during the days of Spanish rule dealt expediently with
the political dynamics of this form of government, such as broad-based political participation. . We
study the elections during the early decades of independence through the beginning of the war with
the United States, and we find that in spite of the fact that during the 1830s there was growing
consensus among the elites that it would be best to implement censitary suffrage, the desire to
exclude the working classes did not prove feasible. None of the factions involved were able to
REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA E POLÍTICA V. 20, Nº 42: 215-219 JUN. 2012
abstain from appeals to the “lower (threatening) classes”. We attempt to explain why this was so.
There are several different hypotheses in this regard. One argument is that the early implementation
of sufferage was a result of competition between antagonistic factions. However, by the end of the
1820s, popular mobilization led to social disorder, such as the destruction of the Parian market. This
stimulated elite preoccupations. At the beginning of the 1830s, the ruling classes held back on engaging
popular classes in electoral struggles. Yet this agreement proved short-lived, with conservatives
giving up on the notion of census suffrage and the renewed insistence of liberals, encouraged by
electoral triumphs, on maintaining a broad electoral base.
KEYWORDS: Representative Government; Mexico; XIXth Century; Voting Rights; Electoral
ces; Political Mobilization.
*     *     *
           
RESUMÉS
AU-DELÀ DU CONSENSUS RESTRICTIF : LES ÉLECTIONS AU MEXIQUE (1809-1847)
José Antonio Aguilar Rivera
Cet article analyse les expériences avec le système représentatif, premièrement dans la Nouvelle-
Espagne, et au Mexique après. Les élections qui ont eu lieu encore sous le domaine espagnol ont
réalisé les dynamiques politiques de cette forme de gouvernement, comme la large participation
politique. On étudie les élections pendant les premières décennies de l’indépendance, jusqu’au début
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de la guerre avec les États-Unis, et il se trouve que, malgré que pour les années trente du XIX siècle,
il y ait eu un consensus croissant entre les élites sur l’envie d’exclure les classes populaires des
élections, il a été impossible de maintenir les exclusions censitaires pendant beaucoup de temps.
Aucune des factions n’a été capable de s’abstenir du recours aux « classes dangereuses ». Le
chapitre essaie de faire comprendre les raisons de cet impossibilité. Il existe plusieurs hypothèses
pour expliquer ce modèle. On affirme qu’au début, l’incomplète ouverture de la libération aurait obéi
à la concurrence entre des factions antagoniques. Toutefois, à la fin des années 1820, la mobilisation
populaire a causé des désordres sociaux, comme la destruction du marché du Parián, ce qui l’a
rendue dysfonctionnelle d’après les élites. Vers les années 1830, les classes dirigeantes ont décidé
de ne pas utiliser les classes populaires dans les disputes électorales. Cependant, cet accord n’a pas
duré et l’on croit que c’est dû au fait que les conservateurs aient abandonné l’idée du suffrage
censitaire, et encore les libéraux , qui auraient renouvelé leur insistance à maintenir une large libération,
grâce à leurs triomphes électoraux.
MOTS-CLÉS : gouvernement représentatif ; Mexique ; XIXè siècle ; droit de vote ; pratiques
électorales ; mobilisation politique.
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